course taken to represent theoretical judgment: "it is so and so", but for a deontic logic this is a rather awkward starting point. All the difficulties of the interpretation of formalisms proposed for deontic logic originate in this thoughtless presupposition. Is a tautology obligatory? How to express a conditional obligation? How is the relation between pure propositional and deontical formulas to be understood in general? 8 When we try to solve these problems we get entangled in mixtures of theoretical and practical judgment that we feel to be very artificial: Why don't we start with practical judgment in the first place'?
If from the beginning we interpret assertion as representing practical judgment instead of theoretical judgment: "so and so ought" instead of "so and so is", the first striking fact is that the counterpart of the axiom of necessity becomes valid. Indeed obligation of so and so ought to entail so and so, which is nowthe meaning of FOp Dp already, whereas it had to be expressed by l-O(Op D p) in the usual interpretation, in which 1-qo meant 'qo is' instead of 'cO ought'. 1~ So the difference in formal representation between modal and deontic logic diappears, which is completely in accordance with our experience that consequence is not different in thought and in action. But there is something else we can learn from this. Obligation, according to our interpretation, represents within the formalism what assertion represents for the formalism. 11 Is this also true for modal logic? If it were, assertion should have to represent necessity there, more precisely the necessity expressed in a theoretical judgment. The "rule of necessity" included in modal systems also points in this direction and can be considered then as a modal supplement of the deduction theorem for material implication. But before this track is followed we have to clarify the meaning of necessity in this context, for several confusions are imminent here. What is not meant by necessity here is (1) necessity in the interconnection of the components of a state of affairs, or (2) the necessity of its existence. Neither of these senses of necessity do we express when we assert that "the state of affairs is so and so" because this state of affairs may be contingent both in its nature and in its existence. What is asserted is the necessity that the state of affairs is so and so just in so far as and in the sense in which the judgment is true. In the case of a purely logical judgment, this may correspond to logical necessity. In the case of a mathematical judgment it corresponds to necessity within a mathematical framework. For an empirical judgment it corresponds to the irrevocability of a fact, and for a metaphysical judgment it might even correspond to absolute necessity. But it is only the logical side of the matter with which we are concerned here. In the light of these considerations the formalisms of modal logic appear as attempts to include part of the epitheory 12 of the propositional calculus in the formalism itself. This is in accordance with C.I. Lewis' interpretation of strict implication as a kind of entailment. This point of view also provides an explanation for some model-theoretical features of modal logic. 13
Returning to deontic logic, the question arises as to how to interpret the transition from necessity to obligation, not only now for an operator within the formalism, but for the fundamental epitheoretical predicate '4 of the whole system and its representation within the formalism. Our interpretation of the assertion in a theoretical sense was connected with the necessity included in the truth is of the asserted proposition. The subjective act of theoretical judgment measures itself by its objective contents. In a practical judgment on the contrary, the contents are measured by the subject with respect to its own standards. This results in assent or rejection. But assent is obligation only in so far as and in the sense in which the practical judgment is "'true" i.e., a subject has obliged itself by it. We consider a theoretical judgment to be true generally if it expresses a state of affairs that is real, precisely in the sense meant. Accordingly, a practical judgment may be considered as true if it expresses a state of affairs that is willed in the intended sense. This intended act of will can be an individual assent or decision, a decision or law of a community, or even a divine commandment.
So modal and deontic logic are already different on the level of propositional calculus. What is assertion in the "theoretical" interpretation, is assent in the "practical" interpretation. Reflected within the formalism, this becomes an operator of necessity, on one hand, and an operator of obligation, on the other. The formalism is the same, the interpretations are different. Does this solve the problems? The first and foremost obligation is integrity of a subject in its acts of will, for this is a necessary condition for the possibility of obligation as such. So what is consistency in the theoretical interpretation of the logical formalism, is integrity in the practical interpretation. Logical consequence, then, should be thought of in terms like: what follows by integrity. Now the deontic counterparts of tautologies and in general logical truths follow by integrity alone; in that sense they can obviously be considered as obligatory. This explains the validity of the rule of necessity (if I-p then tOp) in deontic logic. Even if "assertion" is not conceived as purely logical, but, e.g., with respect to an axiomatic basis, this rule is understandable from our point of view, for "assertion" in that case expresses commitment to the fundamental norms expressed in the axioms. In this context integrity could even be understood as commitment of a subject to itself, which is again a necessary condition for all commitment. '6 Another problem is constituted by sentences such as "I shall take an umbrella if it rains", in which -as it is said -fact and decision seem to be intermixed. But "it rains" is not necessarily a fact at all; actually now that I am writing this it is not. 17
The same connection of characteristics can be the content of assertion and of assent. The reason for the first can be that it is a fact, but this can never be the reason for the second. This is the intuition behind the rejection of the axiom of necessity for deontic logic, but this intuition is brought in at too late a stage of the development of deontic logic. It should have been taken into consideration at the very outset, for the deontic interpretation of the propositional calculus. The difference between fact and action is irrelevant for formal deontic logic. What is relevant is the difference between a "so and so" as a possible content of knowledge and the same "so and so" as a possible content of the will. Anderson (1966) gives an interpretation of the systems of deontic logic as they are usually put forward, in terms of modal logic. This interpretation is very revealing for the status of these systems, in which the axiom of necessity has no deontic counterpart. Anderson defines premissibility as the possibility that something goes unpunished: Pp = D M (p" ~ S) where S is a contingent proposition. It was already observed by von Wright 18 that this presupposes that evil is always punished. He proposes as a solution to interpret S as liability to punishment, which sounds rather like sweeping the question under the carpet. The obvious answer is that evil ought always to be punished, but thereby the reduction of deontic to modal logic is destroyed, because Pp = P (p, ~ S) does not constitute a definition of P. Now ~ S can be regarded as a positive proposition, say IV. 19 Then M)p" W) represents the relative possibility ofp with respect to some proposition that may be regarded as characterizing some "possible world". We could define this relative possibility as follows: MWP = M(p'W) and accordingly a relative necessity L WP = W"-3p. This relative modal system is isomorphic to Anderson's interpretation of deontic logic. Of course a corresponding relative deontic system is also possible. This clarifies the origin of the difference between modal and deontic logic that is usually postulated. The "'absolute" systems of modal logic have always been compared with the "relative" systems of deontic logic. It is clear that, for relative necessity, the axiom of necessity does not hold, for substitution of W for p would give 1-W and so W would not be contingent and L W would become absolute necessity again. When obligation is interpreted as "prescription by some moral code", the notion of relative obligation results and it follows from the contingency of this code that it need not be universally assented to. Nevertheless, the assent to an obligation implies the assent to its content, which is exactly the content of Op D P. So I-Op Dp is based on integrity alone, but I-OwP~ p is based on assent to the moral code expressed by W, so this latter form is more properly expressed by W I-OwP Dp in which shape it is valid again.
Even though the preceding arguments are rather obvious, the reader might feel unsatisfied by the fact that the cleft between ethics and reality cannot be expressed by simply deleting an axiom. The reason for this is that the cleft is so deep that both sides cannot be united into one system of formal logic. Nevertheless, decisions and obligations can be realized, just as assertions can be verified. This can be a complicated process in which theoretical and practical judgment and consequence will be involved and from which formal logic is obtained by abstraction, either in the theoretical or in the practical direction. This unidirectional abstraction gives our system of logic its univocal and mathematizable character. The so-called cleft between ethics and reality is unfathomable only as long as we do not reflect on the abstractions we make. The subjects traditionally studied with the aid of deontic logicconsistency of ethical systems, conditional norm, commitment, the logic of law, etc. -can also be studied from the point of view presented here. It looks like a great advantage that from this point of view the well-developed formalisms of modal logic are available for this purpose. Only the transition from decision to realization falls ouside the scope of this interpretation. It is however questionable whether this transition can at all be investigated by means of logical formalisms. 
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Cf. Anderson (1966) , p. 147 ff.; von Wright (1951 Wright ( ), (1971a Hughes and Cresswell (1968), p. 301; Hintikka (1971) , p. 59; P. Lorenzen (1969) . Cf., e.g., Hughes and Cresswell (1968) , p. 31. We stick to H & C's notation. Cf. Anderson (1966), p. 168; von Wright (1963), p. 109, 110 . See also Copi and Gould (1967), p. 315; Hughes and Cresswell (1968), p. 301; Hintikka (1971), pp. 79-81; Lorenzen (1969 ), p. 70. Cf. yon Wright (1963 . In this last passage von Wright seems to be aware of the problem. This criticism seems not to have occured to most authors on the subject. The only exceptions we have found are Ernst Mally and some of his followers. Cf. Mally (1926 Mally ( , 1971 , pp. 16-20 (J. Mokre's introduction), 231 ff. An extensive bibliography on this subject can be found in Hilpinen (1971) , pp. 31-34. Mally, however, had the serious drawback of missing a clear idea of the formalization of strict implication. He treats, e.g., the formula (Op'pl ~ q)~ ~Oq, as logically valid (Mally, p. 18) . By mistakes like these, he arrives at a useless formalism, which is eagerly asc~'ibed to his alleged wrong philosophical starting point, e.g., by Fr and Hilpinen, in Hilpinen (1971) , pp. 2-4. From our point of view, his philosophical point of departure seems correct but mistakes of a technical nature lead him astray again. In their comments on Mally's followers F & H tend to reject the good with the bad. Indeed some of them make the same technical mistakes as Mally, like A. Hofstadter and J. McKinsey (1939) . Others, like K. Menger (1934 ), J. JCrgensen (1937 and A. Ross (1941) , try to avoid the problems in a semantical way, either in the sense of a many valued interpretation (Menger) or of an interpretation without truth values. The system introduced by Kurt Grelling (1939) seems to avoid Mally's mistakes without change of interpretation, but his system is rather clumsy.
6. "State of affairs" is a somewhat ambiguous term in this respect, because it can mean both a certain connection of characteristics and the actual existence of that connection. Even if -as is done in this paper -the first meaning is chosen, an inkling of the second remains present. This may be confusing when the same connection of characteristics is considered in a normative context. If a "state of affairs" is considered as a possible content of a decision, it proves rather difficult to abstract from the inkling of existence involved in this expression. This sometimes leads to the confusion of a decision with its realization and along this line the confusion of a logic of decision with a logic of action. 7. Gottlob Grege (1891), p. 132, who introduced this distinction in mathematical logic, found that he had made it impossible to express judgment by considering certain mathematical assertions as mathematical objects in order to identify predicate-notions with truth-functions. Therefore he had to introduce the assertion-symbol, which looks like the only predicate in his system that is not a function. In later developments of mathematical logic, assertion was considered as a metamathematical or epitheoretical notion and it was given a semantical as well as a syntactical sense. Therefore it is inappropriate to identify sentences in mathematical logic with assertions or judgments; they represent connections about which assertions can be made on a metamathematical level. Cf. H.B. Curry (1963) , chs. 2 and 3. 8. A proposition is usually considered as an expression of a state of affairs, no matter how this state comes into existence, either by processes of nature or by human action or in any other way. On the other hand, obligation and permissibility seem to apply to human action or its results, Yet it is not possible to restrict proposition-variables in deontic logic to propositions expressing human action or results of these, because this deprives us of the possibility to express conditional obligations like "I ought to take my umbrella if it rains". 9. Cf. yon Wright (1963), chs. 1, 5, 8, 9; Anderson (1966), pp. 171 ft., 196 ft.; A. Soeteman (1973) . 10. The objection could be made that, in the practical interpretation, "1-" should mean decision and that it is very well possible to decide for a norm and against its application. One could reply that it is equally possible to assert a law and deny its application. But that this would be an inconsequence is precisely the content of the axiom of necessity. So its deontic counterpart states that adopting a norm and refusing its application is incontinence. Just as the theses of theoretical logic express the integrity of thought, so the theses of deontic logic express the integrity of the will. 11. Just as in ordinary propositional calculus, material implication represents in the formalism what deducability expresses for the formalism. This fact is expressed by the rule of modus ponens in one direction and by the deduction theorem in the other. 12. The term "epitheory" is introduced by Curry (1963), ch. 3. 13. In the semantical theory of propositional calculus, a formula is defined to be valid iff it is true for "all" valuations:
But what is to be understood by "all" valuations depends on the interpretations of the epitheory. We can express this fact by introducing this ir/terpretation explicitly by the name of w o. We can formulate this as follows:
If the w belongs to a fixed universe of which also w o is a member, and the interpretation of the universal quantor under w o is determined by a special relation R of its arguments with respect to w o, we can reformulate this as follows: This construction may seem somewhat artificial, but this is due to the fact that the interpretation of epitheoretical formulas (like ~ a) is usually considered to be fixed. In modal logic this point of view is expressed by the system $5, where R is an equivalence relation. The nivellation of "epivaluations" and valuations into one universe is the semantical counterpart of the inclusion of an originally epitheoretical notion in a formalism. 14. I.e., the "assertion" predicate; cf. Curry (1963). 15. In H & C's semantics, necessity means truth for all possible worlds under consideration from the point of view from which the necessity is evaluated. 16. This looks like a "subjectivistic" interpretation, which it is not, in the sense that logical validity is not based on subjective decision. Integrity is obligatory for an acting subject as such. This is the absolute presupposition of all ethical relativism. 17. As far as I know! Yet the content of the proposition "it rains here and now" can of course be considered. It can be asserted under certain conditions; it can also be assented to under certain conditions. Usually we do not assert it to be necessary or decide it to be obligatory unless in a relative context, e.g., with respect to a certain factual context or with respect to certain actions to be undertaken, for which it is a necessary condition. "It rains" can even be the content of a decision, e.g., in telling a story. Of course such a logically contingent proposition can in no interpretation be a logical thesis, although it can form part of such a thesis, e.g., "It rains here and now, or it doesn't". Neither thought nor will can have a content that constitutes a third possibility. At least if one adheres to the strict "classical" meaning of negation. 18. Von Wright (1969 ), p. 93. 19. Cf. Kanger (1950 , in Hilpinen (1971), p. 19. 
